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Has Creativity Died in the Third World?
Some Implications of the
Internationalization of Intellectual Property
RUTH L. GANA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recently concluded round of multilateral trade negotiations ac-
complished some significant changes in the multilateral trading system.1
As with its predecessor agreements, the Uruguay Round agreement is ex-
pected to boost the world economy as a result of a negotiated reduction in
tariffs. Under the new agreement, nations made commitments to reduce
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and Society Association Annual Meeting held June 1-4, 1995, in Toronto, Canada. I am very
grateful to Professor Leroy Vail for his unstinting and unwavering support of my scholar-
ship and other professional endeavors. He, as always, read earlier drafts of this article and
gave insightful suggestions and challenging criticism. He has been teacher, mentor and
friend and I express my sincere gratitude to him. I am also grateful to Professor William
Alford whose comments on the relevant chapters of my dissertation sharpened my ideas and
helped me develop my themes more clearly. Professor Rennard Strickland took time from
an extremely busy schedule to read and provide comments which helped me clarify some
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1. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations is the eighth round of world
trade negotiations since the inception of the multilateral trading system established by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. As part of the institutional
framework established by the Bretton Woods system after World War II, the primary pur-
pose of the GATT was to limit government measures which distorted international trade
flows. This goal was important for both political and economic reasons. Restrictive or unfair
trade policies by nations, it was felt, increased the incidence of protective measures by other
sovereign nations which in turn led to retaliatory practices with widespread repercussions.
Economic conflict also engendered political hostilities which had devastating effects on the
world economy. The GATT system was thus the result of what the victor nations of World
War II felt was advantageous for worldwide economic and political stability. Today, good
trade relationships between sovereign nations is still closely linked with political coopera-
tion. See A Gift From the Cold War: Bretton Woods Revisited, THE ECONOMIST, July 9,
1994, at 4, 4.
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tariff rates,2 agreed on clearer rules to govern unfair trade practices, s and
established a unified dispute resolution system.4 Most significantly, the
Uruguay Round established a new international institution, the World
Trade Organization (WTO), to administer and oversee the new body of
trade rules.' Nations ratifying the WTO Charter automatically become
subject to the three annexed agreements 6 which constitute the new
GATT. By offering a "single package" GATT agreement, the WTO Char-
ter ensures that countries wishing to join the multilateral trading system
will be bound by all the agreements, thus eliminating to a large extent,
the problem of free riding.'
As a whole, the "new GATT" is not as much "new" as it is "im-
proved." There is a clear commitment under the WTO charter to con-
tinue to follow and uphold prior GATT decisions, practices, and proce-
2. The Uruguay Round, it is projected, will reduce tariffs by 24% and 38% for devel-
oped and developing countries respectively. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 6 (3RD ED. 1995).
3. The Uruguay round initially was not expected to deal with the Antidumping code
established under the Tokyo Round in 1979. However, dissatisfaction with the 1979 Code
led to a new compromise code, the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement. See AGREE-
MENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ART. VI OF GATT 1994; URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ACT,
PUB. L. No. 103-465, 108 STAT. 4809 (1994). See also JACKSON, supra note 2, at 685.
4. Dispute resolution in international trade is regulated generally by GATT Art. XXIII.
See 61 Stat. A3, 1366, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. Under the Uruguay round, a Dispute
Settlement Understanding was negotiated. See AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE MULTINA-
TIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION) [hereinafter WTO CHARTER],
THE FINAL ACT OF THE MULTINATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (THE URUGUAY ROUND), PART
II, ANNEX 2, SEC. 26.1, 26.2 [hereinafter Uruguay Round]. The Understanding significantly
changes the difficult and frustrating dispute resolution process under the old GATT system.
To reflect the new resolve for strong and effective rules for dispute resolution, Art. III of the
WTO Agreement provides that the administration of the Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes is one of the primary purposes of the Organization. See Uruguay
Round, Part II, Annex 2, Sec.3. Further, the Dispute Settlement Understanding clearly
states that dispute settlement is a core part of the new GATT system. Id. at Part II, Art.
III, Sec. 3.
5. The WTO is a full fledged international institution with legal personality. It is re-
sponsible for the coordination and administration of all the texts which make up the Uru-
guay Round Agreement. The Charter establishes a Secretariat to be headed by a Director-
General who will be assisted by several Assistant Director-Generals. The Charter establishes
a budget and gives the WTO authority to work with other international institutions, includ-
ing non-governmental organizations, to promote the aims and objectives of the GATT. See
id. at Art. V-VIII.
6. There are four annexes to the WTO Charter, but only three are mandatory for all
contracting parties. The first annex consists of the multilateral agreements made up of
GATT 1994, the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the agreement on Trade Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The second annex is the Dispute Settlement
Rules and the third annex the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. See WTO Charter, supra
note 4.
7. The problem of free riding had been a consistent complaint under the old GATT,
particularly because ratification of side agreements was not required of all the contracting
parties. Since the most favored nation (MFN) principle required the extension of conces-
sions to all other GATT contracting parties, some countries were able to gain benefits with-
out attendant costs in concessions. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 383-384.
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dures. s Old rules have been strengthened and new commitments have
been secured to ensure that the world economy benefits from the fruits
which free trade promises. Only months after its implementation, the
Uruguay Round is already beginning to have its intended effect: world
trade is expected to grow 8.9 percent in 1995 and continue into 1996 at
7.8 percent.'
Beyond the institutional changes which the Uruguay Round accom-
plished, and even beyond the economic benefits which the new multilat-
eral agreement offers most countries, the single most important accom-
plishment of the Uruguay Round is the extension of trade rules to new
subject matters. Prior to the Round, the multilateral trade system dealt
primarily with trade in manufactured goods. Under the auspices of the
Uruguay Round, two additional subject matters were added to the juris-
diction of the multilateral trading system: intellectual property and trade
in services. These two new areas resulted in an agreement on Trade Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 0 and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 11 both of which were negotiated
as part of the Uruguay Round. These three agreements, the GATT,
GATS, and TRIPS form the core of the new multilateral trading system
to be administered by the WTO.
This article examines the implications of the TRIPS agreement in
the context of intellectual property issues in Third World countries."2 It
focuses specifically on the impact of the new internationalization of intel-
lectual property on creativity in Third World countries. The broad thesis
is that the nature of protection of intellectual goods proceeds apace with
the rate and development of capitalist relations in a society. Rather than
focusing on the use of TRIPS as a means of combatting international
piracy,'$ or as a tool to secure foreign compliance with minimum stan-
8. See WTO Charter, supra note 4, at Art. XVI:I.
9. See Economy: Slower OECD Growth May Affect Developing Nations, Inter Press
Service, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, Curnws File.
10. TRIPS Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
11. General Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44
(1994).
12. Although aware that the term "Third World" is no longer deemed appropriate for
use, I opted to use this term because the alternative term, "developing countries," typically
denotes sovereign states and is not necessarily inclusive of indigenous peoples. The subjects
of this paper include indigenous groups, such as Native Americans and Aboriginals, pre-
modern societies, such as Israel in Biblical times, as well as developing countries such as
China and Brazil. The common denominator among those subjects is the existence of tradi-
tional organizational norms upon which the larger suprastructure of the modern state is
superimposed.
13. It is no secret that the main impetus behind the TRIPS agreement is to secure
enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights abroad. Very early on in the Uruguay nego-
tiations, intellectual property was identified as a "high priority" for the United States. The
number of articles on this issue are voluminous. For a good overview, see, e.g., Marshall A.
Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilater-
alism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991); Alan S. Gutterman, International Intellectual Property:
A Summary of Recent Developments and Issues for the Coming Decade, 8 COMP. & HIGH
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dards of intellectual property protection,1 this article instead examines
the implications of TRIPS as a form of passive coercion; that is, the re-
quirement that Third World societies establish particular forms of pro-
tection for intellectual goods as a condition to membership in the new
multilateral trading system. This requirement must be met despite the
fact that these forms may be both incompatible with cultural institutions
within these societies and invalid under local law and custom. The
TRIPS agreement thus raises a significant point of conflict between de-
veloping country governments and traditional societies which are constit-
uents of these countries. The conflict is one which implicates the disci-
pline of international law and human rights because the TRIPS
agreement, in this regard, impinges upon the freedom of a collective to
observe, develop and preserve the underlying values of its society as ex-
pressed through law. The state has conflicting obligations to these socie-
ties and to the international community under the TRIPS agreement.
The article then examines what contemporary forms of intellectual prop-
erty protection suggest about creativity in the Third World. Finally, the
article examines the relationship between the "global model" of intellec-
tual property protection and the underlying values and norms expressed
in the protection of creativity in the Third World.
The central claim is that all forms of creative expres-
sion-mechanical, literary, or artistic-are value driven. The nature and
variety of goods produced in any society is, initially, a function of needs
as the popular adage "necessity is the mother of invention" attests. More
important, however, the laws which protect these inventions - laws
which define what is to be protected and how that protection is to be
effected - reflect the underlying values of a society. Intellectual property
law, like other law "is more than just another opinion; not because it em-
bodies all right values, or because the values it does embody tend from
time to time to reflect those of a majority or plurality, but because it is
the value of values. Law is the principle institution through which a so-
ciety can assert its values." 15
Further, the selection of what goods to protect and the nature of
such protection is shaped by values and needs in accordance with a soci-
ety's perceptions of what constitutes "the good life." Nowhere is this
more reflected than in the Anglo-American philosophy of copyright pro-
tection which seeks to balance private reward and encouragement of crea-
tive activity with public benefit of access to a goodly supply of literary
works. In Macauley's celebrated 1841 speech in the English House of
TECH. L. J. 335 (1992).
14. For articles discussing enforcement, see Note, Willard A. Stanbuck, International
Intellectual Property Protection: An Integrated Solution To The Inadequate Protection
Problem, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 517 (1989); R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and In-
ternational Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223
(1989).
15. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 5 (1975) (emphasis added).
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Commons, the need for copyright was expressed as a matter of value and
perceptions of what is needed for a good life:
The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the pur-
pose of giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one;
it is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salutary of human
pleasures... but it is desirable that we should have a supply of good
books: we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally
remunerated; and the least objectionable way of renumerating them is
by means of copyright.1"
In the United States, Thomas Jefferson's famed letter to Isaac Mc-
Pherson on the protection of intellectual property reveals a similar under-
standing of the incidents of the good life and society. In his attempt to
balance the competing values implicated by a proprietary theory of intel-
lectual property protection, Jefferson noted:
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe,
for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature [w]hen she made them like fire, expansible over all space, with-
out lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we
breathe, move and have our physical being, incapable of confinement
or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot in nature be sub-
ject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits aris-
ing from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which
may produce utility, but this may or may not be done according to the
will and convenience of society .... 11
The idea that copyright, as well as other forms of exclusive privileges,
was a necessary part of the good society reflects values such as liberty,
property, private enterprise, accumulation of capital and rapid consump-
tion; in a word, values that nurture capitalism. In the celebrated Slaugh-
ter-House cases18 a majority of the court justified a monopoly privilege on
the grounds that in Great Britain and the United States, these
governments,
• . . representing the people . . . have from time immemorial to the
present day, continued to grant to persons and corporations exclusive
privileges - privileges denied to other citizens - privileges which
come within any just definition of the word monopoly ... ; the power
to do this has never been questioned or denied. Nor can it be truth-
fully denied, that some of the most useful and beneficial enterprises
set on foot for the general good, have been made successful by means
of these exclusive rights, and could only have been conducted to suc-
16. MACAULEY, COPYRIGHT, 195, 197 (Trevelyan ed. 1879), quoted in Zechariah Chafee,
Reflections on Copyright Law, 45 COLUMBIA L. REV. 503, 507 (1945).
17. Reproduced in F.D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787,
26 J. PATENT OFFICE Soc. 711, 759, 760 (1944).
18. 16 Wall (83 U.S.) 36, (1872).
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cess in that way.19
These values resonate in American legal history, and continue to be
reinforced by modern courts. To fully understand how deeply entrenched
in the Western European and American vision of the good life intellectual
property is, and how the forms of protection reflect this, particularly in
the area of copyright, it is important to understand the profound intellec-
tual, social and political influence and transformation brought about by
literacy in Europe.2 0
In Gibben's The History of The Rise and Fall of The Roman Em-
pire,2 ' the importance of literacy was described in the following way,
.. the use of letters is the principal circumstance that distinguishes a
civilized people from a herd of savages incapable of knowledge or re-
flection. Without that artificial help, the human memory soon dissi-
pates or corrupts the ideas entrusted to her charge; and the nobler
faculties of the mind, no longer supplied with models or with materi-
als, gradually forget their powers; the judgment becomes feeble and
lethargic, the imagination languid or irregular. Fully to apprehend
this important truth, let us attempt, in an improved society, to calcu-
late the immense distance between the man of learning and illiterate
peasant. The former, by reading and reflection, multiplies his own ex-
perience, and lives in distant ages and remote countries; whilst the
latter, rooted to a single spot, and confined to a few years of existence,
surpasses, but very little, his fellow-labourer the ox in the exercise of
his mental faculties. The same, and even a greater, difference will be
found between nations than between individuals; and we may safely
pronounce, that without some species of writing, no people has ever
preserved the faithful annals of their history, ever made considerable
progress in the abstract sciences, or ever possessed, in any tolerable
degree of perfection, the useable and agreeable arts of life.2 2
The powerful appeal of literacy, and the vision of the good life it
wrought, was felt all over the world as European expansionism took place
in Asia, in Africa, and in the Americas. The legitimization of this vision of
the good life found a home in Darwin's writings on evolution. Races and
cultures were repeatedly classified in a hierarchical fashion, setting the
stage for the series of historical events such as slavery and colonialism.
Historians Vail and White explain the intellectual setting in the
following:
From the mid-1850s onwards, however, an important shift of empha-
sis in writings about race began to occur. By then it was becoming
clear that ethnology's preoccupation with finding physical differences
19. Id. at 66.
20. See generally, LEROY VAIL AND LANDEG WHITE, POWER AND THE PRAISE POEM,
SOUTHERN AFRICAN VOICES IN HISTORY (1993).
21. EDWARD GmBONS, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
(Womersley ed. 1994).
22. Id. at 235.
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between the races not only encouraged notions of polygenesis offen-
sive to faithful christians but, equally damaging, the study was yield-
ing conclusions of highly doubtful scientific validity. As a conse-
quence, racial theorists began to combine in a new synthesis earlier
romantic preoccupations with the uniqueness of individual national
cultures with the contemporary pride in technological progress arising
from literacy and education. The earlier racism based on calibration
thus yielded to a new racism based on cultural distinctions perceived
as determined by and linked to racial identity; that races with a com-
mon origin could possess fundamentally different cultures and ways of
thinking was soon explained in terms of one of the major organizing
ideas of the last half of the nineteenth century, evolutionism. The
findings of the new science of archeology had transformed the West-
ern perception of humankinds' position in Time from [B]iblical brev-
ity to geological expansiveness. Human history thus could be thought
of as a gradual evolutionary development through a set of stages. By
being situated within the matrix of evolutionism, the old static hierar-
chy of races was given both a temporal dimension and a history. Some
races were different from others because they had experienced greater
cultural evolution from human-kind's common origin than the others.
Important cultural distinctions between races arose from their occu-
pying different places along the path of dynamic evolutionary devel-
opment, with technological advances - such as Gutenburg's invention
of movable type - central to the accumulated differences."'
This intellectual mood was reflected in some literature which, in link-
ing invention to culture, yielded to the temptation to classify in hierarchi-
cal fashion:
The Mediterranean race is the most mechanical of all, the blue-eyed
and the brown-eyed variety must each settle for itself which shall bear
the palm. The Semite is much less so. The mongolian is, perhaps,
more ingenious with his hands. The Africans and Papuans are more
mechanical than the brown Polynesians; the Eskimo than the red In-
dians; and the Australians are the least clever of all. In each several
division of humanity there are smaller centres of invention, owing
both to natural ingenuity and to natural resources. In the higher
walks of language, art, social structures, literature, science and philos-
ophy, the peoples of Europe and Asia will need a new distribution for
each classific concept. The Hebrew has never been excelled for sub-
lime conceptions on religious topics, the Egyptian invented chronicles,
the Greek perfected harmony and portraiture in art, the Romans laid
the foundations for jurisprudence.2 4
The modern debate over intellectual property protection in develop-
ing countries has failed to take account of cultural differences which af-
fect the understanding of what constitutes property or what may right-
23. VAIL & WHITE, supra note 20, at 3.
24. OTIS T. MASON, THE ORIGINS OF INVENTION: A STUDY OF INDUSTRY AMONG PRIMITIVE
PEOPLES 31 (1st ed. 1895) (1966).
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fully be the subject of private ownership. While avoiding the ethnological
categorizations of the nineteenth century literature, it is important for
the modern debate to link intellectual property laws to the social realities
of societies in developing countries. Not only may this yield more effec-
tive approaches to securing enforcement of intellectual property rights in
developing countries, it also presents the possibility that western based
intellectual property laws may have some real impact on industrial inno-
vative activity in these countries, thus contributing to the economic wel-
fare of the Third World. However, as this article argues, culture may in-
fluence what is created but it is those values, rooted in a conception of a
good society, that determine how and what kind of intellectual property
laws societies enact.
II. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Central to Anglo-American intellectual property law2" is the convic-
tion that a system which rewards creativity by granting monopolies over
the use, possession, and disposition of the objects of intellectual endeavor
is a necessary prerequisite for creativity and innovation.2 6 At the heart of
25. The constitutional authority for intellectual property law in the United States is
premised on the principle of national progress. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution
gives Congress legislative power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Out of this mandate, several forms
of protection were crafted for the different expressions of creativity. Patents protect "new
and useful" inventions, 35 U.S.C. 101 (1981); copyright protects "original works of author-
ship" primarily of a literary and artistic nature, 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (1994); and trademarks
secure a monopoly right to use a mark or appellation which identifies a product or a service
(e.g. Exxon or Coca-Cola), 15 U.S.C. 1051 (1991); and trade secrets protects information
such as a "formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process,"
Uniform Trade Secrets Act 1(4) (1985), that has acquired independent market value and
which the owner has made reasonable efforts to keep secret. Id.
26. Creativity and innovation are usually used interchangeably in intellectual property
literature. I use the terms distinctly because in the last few years they have come to reflect
different strands of philosophies underlying intellectual property, particularly in the field of
copyright. Creativity, like all esoteric terms, is difficult to define succinctly. Simply defined
as the act of making something, creativity is, in one sense, the direct object of continental
intellectual property systems. Under French copyright law, for example, the authors right
("droit d'auteur") was conceptualized as a natural right, protecting the very essence of the
personality of the creator and existing independent of a positive grant through statutory
law. As a result, the French copyright system protects a wide variety of rights which include
"personality" rights, i.e., rights which inhere in the very nature of creating. These rights are
referred to as moral rights and they come in three basic forms: the right to disclose the work
to the world (right of publication), the right to be recognized as author (right of paternity),
and the right to prevent unauthorized changes in the work (the right of integrity). For a
general overview of moral rights in the context of the Berne Convention, see SAM RIcKT-
SON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-
1986 5-6 (1987). The philosophy behind these rights is, in one regard, theological; Just as
God created man and thus man is both a reflection and the embodiment of God (See Gene-
sis 1: 26,27), so also the work of a human creator reflects the personality of that creator and
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the matter is a long-held economic theory that explains human behavior
as a series of responses to incentives.2" Underlying this theory is the as-
sumption that rational human beings make choices which will maximize
their individual welfare.28 Property rights, including intellectual property
embodies a part of that creator as well. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Liter-
ary Property In Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990) (arguing
that the differences between the French and American copyright philosophies have been
overstated).
A creativity element (Sch6pfungshdhe) also exists in German copyright law. Unlike its
French counterpart however, Schdpfungsh6he is not linked to individuality. Rather, it is a
practical requirement that "A work must ... rise above craftsmanship, above the average,
• . ." to reflect a "minimum level of intellectual-creative achievement" which is the " quan-
titative aspect" of individuality. Gerhard Schricker, Farewell to the "Level of Creativity"
(Sch6pfungshahe) in German Copyright Law? in 26 INT'L. REV. OF IND. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 41, 42 (1995). Sch6pfungshbhe is thus deployed to help determine the satisfaction of the
requirement, under German law, that a copyrightable work be a "personal intellectual crea-
tion." Id.
Innovation, on the other hand reflects more of the utilitarian vision of Anglo-American
intellectual property systems. In both England and the United States, intellectual property
was regarded solely as a creation of statute. See AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (photo. reprint 1973) (1960).
While a natural rights theory had existed in England prior to the passage of the Statute of
Anne in 1709, the House of Lords decidedly quashed this notion in the case of Donaldson v.
Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774), deciding that the copyright was a creation of statute, and
that the statutory grant superseded any prior conception of the right. In this philosophical
framework, intellectual property is a means to an end. The costs of maintaining a monopoly
system would be well worth the advancement in science and the useful arts, and would
contribute to public welfare by encouraging dissemination of new knowledge and inventions.
See Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or
Monopoly? 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 911, 912-913 (1991). As a result, the goal of the
intellectual property system is to balance these interests in an efficient framework. See S.M.
Besen & L.J. Raskind, 5 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 1, 5 (1991). For an interna-
tional perspective, see Gunnar W.G. Karnell, The Berne Convention Between Authors'
Rights and Copyright Economics- An International Dilemma, 26(1) IIC 193 (1995).
Apart from a general theme of individuality versus utilitarianism, another dimension to
distinguishing creativity from innovation is the commercial impetus that has come to be
associated with innovation. The deployment of large sums of capital for research and devel-
opment stems primarily from a desire to exploit a felt need in the market. See Stephen J.
Kline and Nathan Rosenberg, An Overview of Innovation, in THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY
(N. Rosenberg and R. Landau, eds., 1986) (explaining innovation as the result of the right
combination of commercial opportunities and scientific discoveries/progress). The fear of
free riding from competitors who have not invested the time and resources needed to invent
and market a new product is thus another traditional justification for intellectual property
monopolies, particularly the patent system. It would be helpful if one could bracket creativ-
ity as an element of copyright and innovation as the function of patents, but crossbreeds in
new technologies, such as computer programs and digital technologies which currently are
protected under Copyright law, make this unfeasible.
27. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW vii (1987); See also
Comment, An Economic View of Innovation and Property Right Protection in the Ex-
panded Regulatory State, 21 PEsP. L. REV. 127 (1993); Richard T. Rapp and Richard P.
Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 24
J. OF WORLD TRADE 75 (1990); Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89 (1993).
28. For a leading work on economic analysis of law, including property law, see RICH-
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rights,"9 by securing monopoly privileges, allow individuals to make wel-
fare maximizing choices without the fear of free-riding by members of the
public.30 In theory, the aggregate sum of individual welfare accrues to the
national economy, impacting the level of national wealth and ensuring the
efficient functioning of the marketplace of goods and technology which
are, ultimately, the embodiments of creativity and innovation. In order to
capture the aggregate gain of individual welfare, the ultimate goal of the
intellectual property system must be to "maximize the benefits from cre-
ating additional works minus the losses sustained from limiting public
access to the works, plus the costs of administering copyright protec-
tion.""1 The role of the courts is to police the system, and the rights
claimed within it, to execute this purpose and maintain this efficient
balance.3 2
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, CHAP. 3 (2d ed. 1977). See also, David J.
Gerber, Prometheus Born: The High Middle Ages and the Relationship Between Law and
Economic Conduct, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 674 (1994). More specifically on the economics of
the intellectual property system, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
29. An important theme to understand for the purposes of this article is the process by
which intellectual goods become "propertized" in Anglo-American law, and in the western
world in general. While a full examination is not possible within the confines of this article,
what is important to note here is that the denial of a natural perpetual right in literary
works, for example, led advocates of international copyright to substitute the natural rights
basis of their cause with a property theory (see CLARK, supra note 26, at 26) which was
another powerful concept in western law and, indeed, in western political systems. As early
as 1765, William Blackstone had singled out property as a fundamental feature of human
existence in civil society. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND (1766). This conception of property was, however, limited to physical objects to which
rights attended to. Where incorporeal objects such as rents were concerned, the physicalist
conception of property rectified the rights in order to fit them into the dominant frame of
thought. In American legal history, the changing meaning of the term "property" is associ-
ated with the rise of the modern state in the nineteenth century. Property was "dephysical-
ized" during this period to conform to the needs of the industrial society. An expanded idea
of property was necessary to embrace new alliances and interests created by modernization.
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 3 (1992). In 1964, Charles Reich published the leading article
on the dephysicalization of property, identifying government created jobs, licenses and in-
come as "new property." See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
In the Minnesota Rate Case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that expected earning power,
anything with exchange-value, could constitute a form of property. See Chicago, M.&
St.P.Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). Finally, in the celebrated case of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
copyright as a form of property: "news matter, however little susceptible of ownership or
dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise,
organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay
money for it, as for any other merchandise. Regarding the news therefore, . . . it must be
recognized as quasi property." Id at 236. By 1942, the notion that copyrightable subject
matter was property was firmly entrenched in the American judiciary. See, e.g., M. Witmark
& Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1942).
30. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2.
31. Gunnar W.G. Karnell, supra note 26, at 193.
32. Id.
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The economic incentive theory has permeated the recent discourse
on international intellectual property, s3 as indeed has the utilitarian con-
ception of intellectual property laws."' International intellectual property
has become, primarily, the mechanism for redressing trade deficits and
for maintaining a competitive edge in global markets.-" While interna-
tional intellectual property protection has always secured market shares
for holders of intellectual property rights,"' the transformation of indus-
trial economies into information economies has increased the stakes in
the global dimensions of intellectual property rights.3 As a result, the
emphasis in this era has not been on patent laws which often take the
credit for the rapid pace of western industrialization 3 but rather copy-
right laws which protect the expression of knowledge.
In an economic era defined by global information technologies, 9 a
monopoly right in the fruits of information is indispensable for the gener-
ation of new capital and invaluable for maintaining a global competitive
edge. Intellectual property under the TRIPS agreement is a means to this
end. The agreement is primarily a reflection of the vulnerability of infor-
mation-based economies to the demands of the market for pirated and
counterfeit goods. "° It is also a reflection of values which are integral to
33. Id. See also, Eric Wolfhard, International Trade in Intellectual Property: The
Emerging GATT Regime, 49 TORONTO FACULTY OF LAW REVIEW 107 (1991) (arguing that the
distinction between trade policy and intellectual property is an artificial one, and that eco-
nomic conditions beyond the control of individual nation-states create an interdependence
between trade and intellectual property).
34. See Gutterman, supra note 27.
35. Anne Moebes, Negotiating International Copyright Protection: The United States
and European Community Positions!r, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 301 (1992). See also,
Eric Wolfhard, supra, note 33.
36. See, e.g., C.V. Vaitsos, The Revision of the International Patent System: Legal
Considerations for a Third World Position, 4 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 85-86 (1976); see also
C.V. Vaitsos, Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries, 19 INDIAN Eco-
NOMIC J. (1972);
"The patent system in developing countries has a predominantly negative effect and is
devoid of significant benefits for these countries; virtually all owned by large foreign corpo-
rations, patents are used as a vehicle for achieving monopoly privileges .... " Id.
Similarly, a study prepared in 1957 for the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee concluded
that the provisions of the international patent system " . . . it is evident, have altered the
complexion of the patent grant from one designed primarily to stimulate domestic industry
to one in which the foreign patentee has an increased chance of producing where he chooses
while retaining his patent monopoly." Id.
37. See Moebes, supra note 35. See also R. Michael Gadbaw, supra note 14.
38. "As one looks back over the history of the [United States] he cannot, I think, es-
cape the conclusion that the [patent) system has been a powerful force in our growth from
an insignificant agricultural and trading federation to the most powerful industrial nation
on earth. It is a force too powerful in what it has done, and in what it can still do, to be
tampered with lightly." H.A. TOUMLIN JR., PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1939).
39. See CARNOY ET AL., THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (1993)
(pointing out that the new international division of labor is based on the capacity to gener-
ate new knowledge and to apply it rapidly).
40. This market is the result of a combination of forces which include technological
dependency of Third World countries, pervasive poverty which keeps "genuine" goods out
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western post-modern, capitalist societies; values such as individual owner-
ship, autonomy, economic theories about incentives, all of which are born
out of particularized historical events such as, for example, the industrial
revolution.
By the late eighteenth century in the United States, the combination
of market forces expressed through commercial treaties with Europe, and
the legal foundation already in place in favor of property rights and indi-
vidual autonomy, together created a social system primed for the recogni-
tion of rights in a new form of "property." Things such as good will were
assigned social and economic value in society and it was only a question
of time before protection was extended to other forms of intangible goods.
Whether the emphasis was placed on "rights," or "liberty," or "property,"
the socio-economic ethos was eminently receptive to the idea of proprie-
tary interests in the fruits of creative endeavor. The impetus behind the
TRIPS, an American initiative, is thus not to encourage creativity and
innovation, but rather to protect a particular conception of property priv-
ileges across national borders.41 The agreement, simply put, promotes na-
tional economic interests and social values in the legitimizing form of
treaty law.
By situating intellectual property at the core of international trade
regulation, by making intellectual property the subject of international
trade rules, and by premising membership and participation in the multi-
lateral trade system on the adoption of a global model of intellectual
property protection, intellectual property law has, for the first time, been
"internationalized." That is, intellectual property has adopted a universal
mode which all countries must adopt in order to benefit from the re-or-
dered basis of the international economy.
It is important, before proceeding further, to distinguish between
what in this article will be referred to as the "internationalization of in-
tellectual property," and the international aspects of intellectual property
protection. "Internationalization" refers to the universal mode or "global
model" of intellectual property law made mandatory by the provisions of
the TRIPS agreement. Under this model countries who previously did not
offer protection for intellectual property in the forms recognized in Euro-
pean and American legal systems must now enact substantive laws to
conform to this model. In addition, some countries must create entirely
new structures, ranging from courts to copyright and patent offices, to
administer these new laws. Finally, these countries must develop an intel-
lectual property jurisprudence substantially similar to what currently ex-
ists in the United States and Europe in order to nurture the success of
their new intellectual property laws.
of reach for the vast majority of the population in these countries, the relative ease and low
cost of counterfeiting, and the penetration of European and American cultural goods in
these societies.
41. For good reading on intellectual property in the international trade system, see
Wolfhard, supra note 33; Gadbaw, supra note 14; Leaffer, supra note 13.
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The international aspects of intellectual property protection, on the
other hand, addresses the scope of international protection of intellectual
goods. The focus here is on the nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign
works. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works 42 and the Universal Copyright Convention4 s are the principal in-
ternational instruments for the international protection of copyright. The
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property'" regulates the
international protection of patents. Each of these treaties is administered
by international institutions affiliated with the U.N system.4
Some major differences between the internationalization of intellec-
tual property and the international protection of intellectual property
must be kept in mind. First, the former establishes substantive rules for
the protection of intellectual property while the latter simply delineates a
minimum floor or scope of protection for intellectual property. Put differ-
ently, the TRIPS agreement prescribes both what must be protected and
how, while the Berne, UCC, and Paris Act focus more on elements of
protection. All of the agreements establish minimum standards of protec-
tion; the TRIPS however raises the floor and provides more substantive
rules as well as procedures for enforcement and sanctions. Second, the
former is premised solely on economic considerations, while the latter in-
corporates elements of the natural rights philosophy, recognizing inherent
value in the act of creating."' Third, the former is a condition for partici-
pation in multilateral trade relationships while the latter is not condi-
tioned on anything, but rather is the product of a certain level of real
consensus.47 Non-membership in any of the treaties does not necessarily
42. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.9, 1886,
revised, Paris (July 24, 1971), reprinted in American Intellectual Property Law Association,
Worldwide Protection of Intellectual Property (1984) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
43. The Universal Copyright Convention of September 6, 1952, revised in Paris, July
24, 1971. Reproduced in NORDEMANN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: COMMENTARY (1990).
44. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, revised,
Stockholm (1967), reprinted in AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION,
WORLDWIDE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1984) [hereinafter PARIS CONVENTION].
45. The Berne Convention and the Paris Convention are both administered by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO is an intergovernmental organiza-
tion, established in 1967 as a successor institution to the United International Bureaux for
the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI). It became one of the specialized agencies of
the United Nations in 1974. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO),
a U.N. agency, is responsible for administering the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC).
46. The Berne Convention, for example, protects moral rights which the TRIPS ex-
pressly excludes. Moral rights are rights which protect the relationship between an author
and the work. "Any author, whether he writes, paints or composes, embodies some part of
himself - his thoughts, ideas, sentiments and feelings - in his work, and this gives rise to
an interest as deserving of protection as any of the other personal interests protected by the
institutions of positive law ...;" "[T]he author then enjoys an exclusive right by the sole act
of creating." See RICKETSON, supra note 26 at 456; Andre Lucas and Robert Plaisant,
France, in NIMMER AND GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 10 (1988).
47. At least as between members who participated in its formation. For a detailed his-
tory reflecting the negotiation and compromise that resulted in the Berne Convention, see
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result in political ostracism" nor denial of material benefits;4' the goals of
the latter may be accomplished through bilateral agreements, thus mak-
ing the multilateral agreement unnecessary if a country deems that a bi-
lateral approach is more feasible or more prudent for its well being.50 The
institution which implements the former, i.e. the World Trade Organiza-
tion, may make substantive "law" as a result of the dispute resolution
system it is charged with utilizing.5 1 The institutions 2 which implement
the latter, on the other hand, do not have any formal dispute resolution
mandate and do not have independent authority to make law in the judi-
cial sense. These institutions may only be involved, if at all, in dispute
settlement at the request of two contracting parties. For the treaties ad-
ministered by the World Intellectual Property Organization," explicit
provision is made for the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
over conflicts involving the interpretation or application of the treaties.5 4
Finally, another important difference between the internationaliza-
tion of intellectual property and the international aspects of intellectual
property lies in the structure of the institutions which administer these
treaties. Significant differences exist, both in terms of their scope of re-
sponsibility, in their processes of dispute settlement, and in the binding
nature of their decisions. As mentioned earlier, one of the key functions
of the WTO is dispute resolution.5 5 With particular regards to intellectual
property disputes, a Council for the TRIPS agreement was established
under the WTO Charter." The TRIPS Council is responsible for moni-
toring the operation of the TRIPS agreement and compliance by con-
RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 233.
48. The U.S. for example, refused to join the Berne Convention for many years without
any significant problems. Even its recent accession in 1989 is questionable in terms of full
compliance with minimum Berne standards. See RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 233; J.C.
Ginsburg & J.M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the
Berne Convention, 13 COLUMBIA-VLA J. L. & ARTS 1 (1988).
49. Except of course, for whatever was lost by the fact of nonmembership.
50. The U.S. and many other countries favored a bilateral approach for many years
preceding the Berne. See RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 25-30. Bilateral agreements on intel-
lectual property are still used today, in addition to the multilateral agreements. See, e.g.,
Memorandum of Understanding On The Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992,
34 I.L.M. 676. For an insightful overview of these agreements, see William Alford, Perspec-
tive on China: Pressuring the Pirate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at M5.
51. See GATT, supra note 4, at Art. XXIII.
52. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the United Nations Ec-
onomic and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) respectively.
53. See, STATES PARTIES To THE CONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION AND THE TREATIES ADMINISTERED BY WIPO AND STATE MEMBERS OF
THE GOVERNING BODIES AND COMMITrEES OF WIPO (Status on May 1, 1993), WIPO Docu-
ment 423(E).
54. Art. 33 of the Paris Act of the Berne Convention makes acceptance of the jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice optional by means of a reservation to that effect
by a member country at the time of ratification or accession to the Convention. See Berne
Convention, supra note 42, at Art. 33(2).
55. See WTO Charter, supra note 4.
56. See id.
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tracting parties.5 Disputes arising under the agreement are governed by
the central dispute resolution process of the WTO. 5 s Very briefly, under
this process, disputing countries are required to consult with each other
with an intent on resolving the dispute. If after 60 days the dispute re-
mains unresolved, a complaining party may request the establishment of
a dispute resolution panel. 9 The panel hears oral arguments and reviews
written submissions of both parties. A panel report containing detailed
conclusions and the panel's legal analysis is submitted to the disputing
parties for comments. The final panel report is then submitted to the dis-
pute settlement body (DSB) and must be adopted by the body at the
second meeting on which the report is placed on the agenda. Any party to
the dispute may appeal to the appellate body.60 The implementation of
the panel or appellate report recommendations, whichever is adopted, is
monitored by the DSB to ensure that the offending member complies
with GATT rules. In the event of non-compliance the prevailing party is
entitled either to compensation or to request authority to suspend conces-
sions made to the offending party."
This elaborate structure is duplicated in form or substance neither
under the Paris or Berne Conventions nor under the UCC. The activities
of the World Intellectual Property Organization are limited to the coordi-
nation and promotion of intellectual property protection in various coun-
tries. The "overall objectives of WIPO are to maintain and increase re-
spect for intellectual property throughout the world, in order to favor
industrial and cultural development. ... " The internationalization of
intellectual property provides a more rigid framework and perhaps, con-
sequently, promises more consistency and coherency under this new
system.
In summary, the merger of intellectual property with the multilateral
trading system has ushered in a new era for international aspects of intel-
lectual property protection. The protection of intellectual property
through trade accomplishes several important things:
1. easier international monitoring through the institutional apparatus
of the World Trade Organization;
2. the increased nationalization of intellectual goods, by which pri-
vate (individual) rights have essentially been transformed into public
57. Id.
58. See Art. 64(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. See also WTO Charter, supra note 4.
59. Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the WTO Secretariat is responsible
for recommending panel members. Where disputing parties do not agree with the recom-
mendations, the GATT Director-General is authorized to appoint the panel in consultation
with the Dispute Resolution Body (DSB) and other relevant committees or council. See
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 342.
60. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing The Settlement of Dis-
putes, Annex 2, World Trade ORganization Agreement.
61. See id. For more details, see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 340-346.
62. BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, WIPO PUBLICATION,
40 (1988).
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(state) rights;as
3. the internationalization of intellectual property, by which coun-
tries who desire to be a part of the liberal trading system are required to
enact laws to comply with the TRIPS agreement and as a result
4. the creation and establishment of a global system of intellectual
property protection.
III. CREATIVITY IN THE THIRD WORLD
Nothing is more common than the assertion that men do not pur-
posely invent in the lower civilisations, that they simply follow the
leading strings and the mandates of nature. The savage, it is said,
does not invent, he simply borrows his clothing from the animals, his
house from the trees and caverns, his food from many sources. He is
an out-and-out imitator. But [t]he race or people that did not lay at
least one dressed stone on this stately edifice (of nature) cannot possi-
bly have survived.6'
This section will examine various fundamental differences in the phi-
losophies underlying systems for protecting creative endeavor in the
Third World. As mentioned earlier, the term "Third World" as employed
in this article is inclusive of indigenous groups which have not attained
formal statehood but who are recognized both in the national and inter-
national sphere as having a distinct political, cultural, and social identity
within a formal state. Such groups include Native Americans and aborigi-
nal groups, and other indigenous or "traditional" societies.
At the outset, this section does not examine the integration of devel-
oping countries into the international intellectual property system, 65 nor
the concerns of developing countries about the intellectual property sys-
63. Under the WTO only contracting parties (limited to sovereign states) may bring
claims for dispute resolution. The multilateral trade system does not recognize private par-
ties. As such states stand in the shoes of their citizens to press for redress over intellectual
property infringement. This transformation of a private right is not new to the multilateral
trade system, neither is it new in dealing with international intellectual property issues.
Under U.S. trade laws for example, the United States Trade Representative is authorized to
undertake a wide variety of measures against countries identified as denying adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2242,
§ 2901 (1993). The legitimate reach of this power is questionable in a post-Uruguay round
era.
64. Mason, supra, note 24 at 19, 23 (1895).
65. Most developing countries were subject to the principal intellectual property trea-
ties (with the exception of the UCC) by virtue of their status as colonies of sovereign states
who ratified these treaties. After attaining political independence most of these ex-colonies
acceded to the treaties in their new status as independent sovereign entities. I have ex-
amined elsewhere the reasons surrounding developing country ratification of these treaties
and the process of integrating these countries into the international system. See Ruth L.
Gana, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AT THE CLOSE OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (S.J.D. Dissertation, Harvard Law
School (unpublished manuscript on file with the author)) (1995).
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tern as a whole. 6 Rather, this section examines indigenous attitudes re-
garding creative ability and the forms of protection offered through the
norms which underlie social, political, and legal organization in these soci-
eties. For effective discussion, two related and longstanding themes about
creativity and its protection in the Third World are addressed. The first
is a myth which holds that creative activity is non-existent in Third
World countries. The second is an assumption, perhaps originating from
the myth, that intellectual property laws do not exist in these countries. 7
I suggest that the real issue behind these two themes is that the attitudes
and rules governing the protection and dissemination of the fruits of crea-
tive endeavor in Third World societies do not mirror those which exist in
western industrial post-modern societies. Finally, this section questions
another assumption that the chosen forms" of protection for intellectual
property in these societies are objective or scientific models which inhere
somehow in the nature of creativity and so must be adopted by all who
wish to protect and encourage creative activity.
A. Has Creativity Died in the Third World?
As stated earlier, the prevailing wisdom of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence justifying intellectual property laws is that such laws are a neces-
66. During the development era, a veritable amount of literature was produced by de-
velopment economists, classical economists, political scientists, and scholars from other dis-
ciplines about the role of intellectual property laws in the development process. Develop-
ment scholars argued endlessly about the negative effects of patents in particular, on
economic development, and technology transfer. The major arguments centered on the ef-
fect of the patent grant on indigenous creativity. By granting a seventeen year monopoly on
a process or machinery, independent inventors of the same product or machinery could not
legally use or develop the machine or process. In addition, improvements to licensed tech-
nology were contractually assigned to the licensor as a precondition for, or term of the li-
censing agreement. Arguments also focused on the role of multinational corporations in hin-
dering the exposure of local employees to technology utilized by the firm. These arguments,
and the literature on technology transfer to the developing world, the phenomena of techno-
logical dependency and the effect of the international intellectual property system continue
to abound today. See, e.g., CHARLES GOULET, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE, VALUE CONFLICTS IN
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1977) (2 ed. 1989).; A.Samuel Oddi, The International Patent Sys-
tem and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 63 DUKE L.J. 831 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Kirsten Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends In Developing
Countries, 33 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 277 (1992); Brent W. Sadler, Note,
Intellectual Property Protection Through International Trade, 14 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1992); Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding
the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L.R. 89 (1993); Marshall
A. Lea fer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multi-
lateralism, 76 IOWA L.R. 273 (1991). I think it would be a fair appraisal to say that much of
the existing literature on intellectual property in developing countries assumes this fact,
including literature by scholars from developing countries.
68. That is, patents, copyrights and trade secrets, together with the various require-
ments on which their validity is based, e.g. a copyright must be an "original expression,"
"fixed," 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a) (1994); a patent must be a "new" idea, reduced to a working
form, and the inventor must have been the first to invent it (at least under U.S. law) 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1981).
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sary prerequisite for creativity.6 9 The argument is not that creative activ-
ity will not take place at all without intellectual property laws which give
a property right in the fruits of creative energy, but rather, that such
activity will be minimal70 and industrial growth will be constrained.7 1 As a
result, the enactment of intellectual property laws has been linked to eco-
nomic development, growth, and prosperity.72 Failure to enact intellectual
property laws, some literature suggests, results in economic stagnation,
the inefficient use of scarce resources, technological backwardness, and
general economic malaise .7 Further, the absence of intellectual property
laws discourages indigenous creativity and innovation.7 It is with this
claim, and more specifically, the inference that creative activity does not
69. Virtually every article one picks up on intellectual property echoes this justification.
I mentioned earlier that the premise of this reasoning is an economic theory: "By defining
the parameters for the use of scarce resources and assigning the associated rewards and
costs, the prevailing system of property rights establishes incentives . . . for investment,
production and exchange. Since property rights define the behavioral norms for the assign-
ment and use of resources, it is possible to predict how differences in property rights affect
economic activity." Rapp & Rozek, supra note 27, at 77.
70. See Meiners & Staaf, supra note 26, at 911, 913.
71. The strongest testament against this argument is the recent transformation of coun-
tries of such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. These countries have
become efficient producers of technology goods and, thus, have come to occupy positions of
strategic importance in modern international economic relations. The gains made by these
countries certainly are not due solely or even largely to intellectual property laws. Rather,
these countries and others economies such as that of India and more recently China, em-
barked upon economic and political reforms which encouraged domestic innovation and
competitiveness by developing R & D infrastructure which improved local capacity to ab-
sorb technical and scientific knowledge. In addition, export oriented strategies were imple-
mented in countries such as Korea and India, combined with investment in education and R
& D and general liberalization of foreign investment regulation. See generally AGMON & VON
GLINOW, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1991); JOSEPH M. GRIcco, BE-
TWEEN DEPENDENCY AND AUTONOMY, INDIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER
INDUSTRY (1984).
72. This argument has been around for sometime and indeed is to be found among the
development literature I mentioned earlier. For contemporary advocates of this thesis, see
Richard T. Rapp and Richard P. Rozek, supra note 27. See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1990); Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual
Property Rights, Technological Change, and Economic Growth, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloom-
field eds., 1988).
But cf. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287
(1954); A. Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMIC 67,
67-95 (1934); Stephen Bryer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); A. Plant, The
Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMIC 167 (1934). All arguing that the
award of copyrights and patents is unnecessary to stimulate or encourage creative activity.
73. SHERWOOD, supra note 72; Mansfield, supra note 72; see also Rapp & Rozek, supra
note 27.
74. In addition to other literature, WIPO publications tend to take this position. See,
e.g., BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 62, at 43:
"Without a national industrial property system and, more particularly, a patent system, it
will be difficult for a country to stimulate and protect the results of indigenous innovation."
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exist in the Third World as a consequence of weak or non-existent intel-
lectual property laws75 that issue is taken in this section7 6 with discussion
limited to the context of copyrights, the most recent bone of contention
between developed countries and the Third World.7
The subject matter of copyright protection is creative expression.7 8
Copyright protects the expression of an idea and not the idea itself,79 the
latter being the purview of patent law. 0 In order to be copyrightable, an
expression must be original and fixed.81 These elements constitute the
core of formal requirements for copyright-ability in most legal systems
today.2
Creative expression has been a part of human experience ever since
Adam "named" the animals and, later, Eve in the garden of Eden.8 The
essence of communication, whether in language, prose, song, or symbol,
requires some modicum of creativity and forms the core of every society,
75. Id.; see also Gutterman, supra note 67, at 55, 59.
76. The title for this paper was a question I had long been grappling with since my
"baptism" in this area of study. The perennial question of piracy, and the implications that
the Third World stole what it could not create were troublesome to me. More troublesome
however, was the implication that resistance to intellectual property laws, or the refusal to
enact particular forms and of intellectual property laws, were persistent because there was
nothing to protect in the Third World. I began my research by asking the question, is there
no creativity in the Third World?
77. I have also chosen to limit my discussion to copyrights because of the discernible
difference between creativity and innovation. See Kline & Rosenberg, supra note 26. The
difference currently is of no legal import per se, but it has some implications for my broader
thesis.
78. See 17 U.S.C.A., § 102(a) (1994).
79. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S 201, 217 (1954).
The idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law is a fundamental, but troublesome, doctrine
in copyright law particularly in the area of new technologies. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l
v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d. 693 (2d Cir. 1992). "Drawing the line between idea and expression is
a tricky business." Id. at 704; Whelan Assoc. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983); Peter Pan Fabrics Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960) "Obvi-
ously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea'
and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Id. at 489.
The idea/expression dichotomy is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
80. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The fixation requirement for copyright protection
requires a work of authorship to be fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated. This requirement which is
also incorporated in the Berne Convention, and now the TRIPS agreement, is problematic
for many indigenous societies which do not maintain forms of literary expression. For exam-
ple, many African societies and Native American societies have oral traditions. The contem-
porary norms of copyright law preclude the representation of the vast wealth of oral litera-
ture existing in these societies, in the copyright system as a result of this fixation
requirement.
82. This uniformity in part, reflects the international consensus expressed in the trea-
ties governing copyright. See, e.g., Art. 2, Berne Convention; Art. I, Universal Copyright
Convention.
83. See Genesis 2:19-23.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
regardless of its stage of development. Indeed, any cursory study of his-
tory or anthropology will reveal that every society at any stage of devel-
opment invented, created, and developed sui generis products necessary
to sustain the life and well being of the society. These products were both
mechanical, such as farming tools, and expressive, such as music, arts,
and literature. The same holds true for the Third World and the contin-
ued vitality of creative expression is undeniable.84 From songs to dances,
artistic designs, paintings, sculptures, herbal and other medicinal formu-
las, and folktales, the list of protectable subject matter emanating from
Third World societies is endless. These products are often located in
western market economies as goods for sale or as objects of educational
benefit in museums.
In addition to the manifestation of creativity in material objects, cre-
ative expression in Third World societies often takes place in the context
of specific cultural institutions which are responsible for accumulating
and preserving the history and heritage of the society. Creative expression
through the famous "talking drums" of Yoruba tradition is but one exam-
ple of this phenomena. 85 In a great number of African societies, oral liter-
ature remains a significant form of creative expression. While the validity
of the term "oral literature" has been debated by anthropologists, histori-
ans, and ethnologists,s8 it seems clear that societies not restricted to
printed expression, indeed those whose intellectual and creative exper-
iences have not been formed around Gutenberg's press nor defined by
printed works fall completely outside the sphere of copyright norms. Con-
sequently, creativity in indigenous societies of most Third World coun-
tries do not "fit" the model for copyright protection which has captured
the landscape of international economic relations in this era.
The critical point to note about recognizing creativity in the Third
World is that forms of recognition and protection are a function of, and
deeply embedded in, the institutions and underlying norms of social or-
ganization. In one sense, this is no different from the forms of protection
for intellectual goods in the developed world. The individualism on which
property rights are based and the nature of commodification which is cen-
tral to liberal market economies are reflected clearly in modern intellec-
tual property laws.
As far back as Biblical times, these goods which are now the subject
matter of intellectual property were not protected in the forms and cate-
gories of patents, copyrights, trademarks, or trade secrets.87 Indeed, it was
84. See, e.g., KARIN BARBER, THE POPULAR ARTS IN AFRICA (1986).
85. See BARBER AND FASIAS, DISCOURSE AND ITS DISGUISES: THE INTERPRETATION OF AF-
RICAN ORAL TEXTS (1989).
86. On this matter, and on the subject of the use and power of oral literature in social
and political organization in African society, see VAIL & WHITE, supra note 20.
87. A trade secret protects information, such as "a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique or process" which generates independent economic value.
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4) (1985). To be protectable, a secret must not be known
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not until the era of Kings in ancient Israel that material reward was given
for the results of creative effort.88 Yet, creativity and its fruits existed,
and in abundance!
During the reign of King Solomon,8 9 intellectual endeavor and skill
expressed in literary and artistic works was recognized, protected, and re-
warded. 90 In the process of building the Temple,9 1 Solomon requested
woodcarvers from the King of Tyre after acknowledging their superior
skill in the art of carving.9 2 Solomon hired Hiram of Tyre, who was "filled
with wisdom, understanding and skill to work (engrave) with bronze."
The Sidonians, a people recognized for their great carving skills, were also
hired to carve designs and sculptures for the Temple.9 ' The elaborate en-
gravings of Hiram and the sculptures of the Sidonians certainly consti-
tute protectable subject matter under modern copyright laws.9 5 These
works and the individual artists were, however, not "protected" in the
form copyright law today provides. Apart from the fact that duplication
of the Temple design was nearly impossible, 8 creative ability in this soci-
ety was attributed to God who inspired these artists and gave the skill
which was used in the creation of the products.9 7 Similarly, the Pima-
Papago Native American tribe distinguished "picked up songs" (learned
from other tribes or white settlers) from "dreamt songs" (obtained from
spirits) and "songs given in the beginning" (in a sense, natural songs).98
In this understanding of "authorship," like that of ancient Israel, the in-
dividual was not recognized as the source of the created work. The idea of
Hiram "owning" the Temple engravings or the Sidonians "owning" the
and there must be reasonable efforts made by the claimant to maintain its secrecy. Id.
88. Solomon paid wages for the work of the Sidonians. He also gave Hiram twenty
thousand cors of wheat and twenty cors of pressed oil each year until the Temple was com-
pleted. See 1 Kings 5:6,11.
89. 961 B.C. - 922 B.C.
90. See 1 Kings 5:6.
91. See 1 Kings 5:5.
92. 1 Kings 5:6.
93. I Kings 7:13,14; see also 2 Chronicles 2:14.
94. It is interesting to note that a similar arrangement is valid under contemporary
intellectual property law. Under the "work for hire" doctrine, an employer is regarding as
the lawful owner of a product created or invented by an employee during the course of
employment. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 101(1) (1981); see also Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
95. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a)(5) (1994) (recognizing pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works as copyrightable subject matter). See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
96. See I Kings 7: 15-43.
97. See, e.g., Exodus 31:1-6: "Then the Lord spoke to Moses saying, 'See I have called
by name Bezaleel, the son of Uri, the son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah. And I have filled
him with the Spirit of God, in wisdom, in understanding, in knowledge, and in all manner of
workmanship. And I, indeed I, have appointed with him Aholiab the son of Ahisamach, of
the tribe of Dan; and I have put wisdom in the hearts of all who are gifted artisans, that
they may make all that I have commanded you.' Id.
98. HAROLD E. DRIVER, THE INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 221 (1962).
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woodcarvings would have been unthinkable; indeed, it would have been
tantamount to a claim by Moses of ownership of the ten commandments
(which, incidentally, also qualify as copyrightable subject matter).9" The
forms of intellectual goods recognized in this Biblical example (sculptures
and engravings) were first protected in the United States under the Copy-
right Act of 1909.100
Under Moses' leadership, elaborate rules existed governing the use
and ownership of a new process or formula. For example, use of anointing
oil, in ways or for purposes other than those prescribed, was prohibited
by law, 101 and sanctions for violation were clearly spelled out. 02 The
norms which governed recognition of creative effort were rooted in the
nature of the theocracy under which ancient Israel, at the time, was gov-
erned. Not surprisingly, the primary reason for protection was ecclesiasti-
cal with the goal of preserving the sanctity or purity of a process or prod-
uct in obedience to a holy command. This "controlling" feature in
copyright has a long history. For example, it was evident in England dur-
ing the nineteenth century when controlling the press was essential to the
government's decision to grant a stationer's copyright.' 08 In order to
maintain purity of text, censorship was also a dominant feature of copy-
right law in Imperial China.'" Additionally, while China led the world in
the invention of printing'05 and several other significant technological ad-
vances, China, until very recently did not protect creativity in the forms
expected by prevailing western jurisprudence.' °0
99. Actually, even much more than the wood carvings or Temple designs, the ten com-
mandments are clearly copyrightable subject matter. The four main requirements of copy-
right - copyrightable subject matter (the commandments are literary work), originality
(who would doubt this?), fixation (written on tablets of stone), authorship and ownership
(who would claim it? This wouldn't be a problem as Moses had the rights "transferred" to
him on Mount Sinai!). See generally Exodus 20:1-17; 34:1. Obviously, the term of copyright
protection would have expired by now.
100. See U.S. STAT. AT LARGE, VOL. 1, 124 (1789). The Act originally extended copy-
right protection to "authors of books, maps and charts"). Id. Sec. 1. Through a series of
amendments however, the scope of copyright protection was expanded to include among
other things, artistic works and sculpture. Thus by 1903, courts recognized copyrightable
subject matter in a variety of products which were expressive of creative effort in a literary
or artistic sense. See, e.g., Bleisten v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)
(recognizing copyright in chromolithographs).
101. See generally Exodus Chapter 30.
102. Id.
103. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VANS. L. REV. 1,
21-22 (1987); see generally AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (photo. reprint 1973) (1960).
104. See William P. Alford, Don't Stop Thinking About . . . Yesterday: Why There
Was No Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law in Imperial China, 7 J. CHI-
NESE L. 3, 11-18 (1993).
105. Block printing was invented in China in the 6th century and paper was invented
around A.D. 105. See NORBERT WIENER, INVENTION: THE CARE AND FEEDING OF IDEAS 47
(1993).
106. Alford, supra note 104, at 6-7.
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Intangible property was recognized by all Native American groups. 10 7
Examples of such goods include familiar objects of modern intellectual
property law such as songs, dances, formulas, as well as less familiar types
of intellectual property such as myths, membership in sibs and sodalities,
and magic formulas."' 8 The type of property recognized included the right
to participate in ceremonies, the right to wear certain insignia and the
right to perform a particular dance. 00 In terms of protection for
processes, knowledge of herbal medicines developed through a process of
time and training was guarded by the institution of native doctors. 1
Other kinds of specialized knowledge, such as new hunting methods or
other skills, were taught to the community or to selected members of the
group.
There is some sense in intellectual property literature that once the
development concerns are substantially resolved, 1 1' intellectual property
issues will "fit" in the developing world structure. This approach ignores
the fact that local perceptions of intangible goods, in particular goods
which result from creative activity, and local values which shape a system
of protection for these goods have never been seriously considered in the
context of the North-South debate over intellectual property protection.
Substantive intellectual property doctrine has played an ancillary role in
this debate, with the issue framed, primarily, in ideological terms. 1
Scholarship from both sides tends to focus exclusively on the economic
impact of protecting intellectual property rights.113 However, there is
nothing conclusive available in the economic literature about the effect of
intellectual property rights;"' yet, there is nothing that takes into ac-
count indigenous perceptions of intangible goods and indigenous ap-
proaches to intellectual property protection. These may very well have
more of a significant impact on the success of intellectual property pro-
tection in developing countries.
107. See DRIVER, supra note 98, at 263.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 264.
110. Id. at 219.
111. These concerns include technological "backwardness," huge national debt, pov-
erty, illiteracy, and political instability.
112. The ideology of intellectual property, quite distinct from its philosophy, has also
been a point of conflict between developed and developing countries. During the develop-
ment era, scholarship from a "Third World perspective" regarded intellectual property and
scientific knowledge in general as "the common heritage of mankind." This view held that
preventing access to the fruits of modern science was wrong and ought not to be enforced
within an international system premised on equality. Western European countries as well as
the United States rejected this position, maintaining that science and technology were the
result of investment and labor. As such, the fruits of invention belong to the creators and
not, to "humanity."
113. Oddi, supra note 66; VAITSOS, supra note 36.
114. Some scholars have concluded that it is simply impossible to determine exactly,
whether, how, and why intellectual property systems are indispensable to a society.
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B. Elements of Laws and Norms Concerning The Regulation and Pro-
tection of Creative Efforts In Indigenous Societies
Recognition and protection of intellectual goods in indigenous socie-
ties differs substantially from the modern treatment of intellectual prop-
erty in industrialized nations.
A first cause of the differences in treatment of intellectual property is
that forms of property ownership in these societies are different. Many
indigenous societies are not organized around individuals as such but
around a clan or other extended unit.115 As such, "ownership" means
something different from its accepted conception in Anglo-American law.
Property in most western societies consists of a bundle of rights. The
most important of these rights are the right to absolute possession, the
right to exclude others from use, and the right to dispose of the property
as one wishes. Virtually all forms of property in western societies are de-
fined in relation to these rights; the most important right being the right
to exclude." 6 This absolutist conception of property in Anglo-American
law was transferred wholesale into the domain of intellectual goods. 17
Exclusive individual ownership of goods, however, is not a scientific
principle of social existence. Exclusive ownership was, for example, a rare
feature of social organization in some Native American tribes.1 8 Notwith-
standing this fact, however, all Native American groups recognized own-
ership rights in intangible property,' including some objects familiar to
modern intellectual property laws such as songs, dances, and formulas, 120
as well as less familiar ones, such as myths, membership in sibs, sodali-
ties, and magic formulas. 1 2 Among the Mesa-Indians of North America,
rights in intangible goods as well as other goods included the right to be
recognized as "owner," but not the right to exclude others from use.1 22
115. It is important not to confuse the clan or hamlet with the broader society as a
whole. Perhaps a helpful analogy is once again the Biblical nation of Israel. There are twelve
tribes which together comprised this political unit. See Exodus 1:1-4. Each tribe, however,
was identified by specific rules, specific histories, and in some cases, specific sub-cultures.
116. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 12 (1927).
"The essence of private property is always the right to exclude." Id.
117. In INS v. Associated Press, supra note 79, at 246. Justice Holmes and Brandeis
maintained a vigorous dissent to the court's decision to diminish the absolutist conception
of property when it related to property in news. Property could not be "quasi" the justices
maintained. The distinguishing feature of property was its absolute nature. Id; see also
HORWITZ, supra note 29.
118. See DRIVER, supra note 98.
119. Id.
120. Protected under copyright law and trade secret law respectively. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1994); Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985).
121. See Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understanding
Preserving, and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians:
Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZONA ST. L.J. 175, 184
(1992).
122. See DRIVER, supra note 98.
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Even where individual ownership was possible within certain Native
American groups, such ownership was limited to specific categories of
goods. ss For example, Native Americans along the Northwestern coast of
North America recognize private ownership, in the exclusive sense, of
fishing, trapping, and wild plant gathering rights.1 2 ' "Ownership" accord-
ing to this group of Native Americans was really a form of stewardship,
wherein an owner in title was recognized, but the refusal to bar other
members of the society from using the product was not permitted.1 2 5
Another important feature of "ownership" of intangible goods in cer-
tain Native American groups is that tribal laws often restrict the right to
dispose of the good.1 26 Typically, this restriction was limited to disposi-
tion to non-members of the group. In addition, sometimes one was per-
mitted to exclude members of the clan from using or making a good
which was the subject of an ownership claim, but very often the owner
could not assert these rights against family members.1 27 Finally, it is im-
portant to note that ownership is a function of the system of rights distri-
bution. In some Native American groups, exclusive "ownership" rights
could be earned, such as a right to sing a bear song, to participate in a
traditional ceremony, or to take on a certain name.12 8
A second cause of difference in intellectual property treatment in
Third World countries lies in the purpose of protection. Whereas the
stated underlying purpose of Anglo-American intellectual property law is
to encourage creative endeavor, protection of creative endeavor in Third
World societies is purposely used to achieve a myriad of social, political,
and economic goals. Thus, in Imperial China, unauthorized copying was
forbidden out of concern for the ways in which various commodities were
identified (i.e. a form of trademark law), in an attempt to maintain the
purity of classic texts12 9 as well as to fulfill the censorship function men-
tioned earlier. Concern for public order or morals 80 also led to outlawing
of reproduction and dissemination of "devilish books and talk," to pre-
serve the supremacy of certain literary and to prevent the spread of
123. Id. at 251.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Thus, for example, one of the key elements of the Native Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (1990) (NAGPRA) is that the concept of "ownership" or "right of posses-
sion" is cast in the Native American cultural context. See Strickland, supra note 121, at
180; see also Rennard Strickland & Kathy Supernaw, Back to the Future: A Proposed
Model Tribal Act to Protect Native Cultural Heritage, 46 ARK. L. REy., 161, 165 (1993).
127. Id.
128. See DRIVER, supra note 98.
129. Alford, supra note 104, at 11.
130. While the protection or preservation of public order and morals is not a central
feature of most Western copyright laws, exceptions do exist for government interference
with the rights of individual authors when it is necessary for the public interest. A similar
provision exists under the Berne Convention. See Berne Convention, supra note 42, at Art.
17.
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works that would denigrate imperial authority." 1
For many indigenous societies, protection exists to protect the sanc-
tity of a process or idea, to preserve cultural patrimony and in particular,
to preserve the sacredness of an object, or to preserve the sacredness of
meaning. In the recent case of Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty Ltd.,32 the
applicant and other well-known and internationally recognized Aboriginal
artists brought an action for copyright infringement under the Australian
Copyright Act of 1968 against a company, Indofurn, and its three direc-
tors, who were selling rugs bearing unauthorized copies of various paint-
ings by the applicants. The company had imported carpets from Vietnam
which bore imprints of the works of the various artists. The carpet de-
signs were substantial reproductions of various paintings which the appli-
cants had authorized for use by the Australian National Art Gallery
(ANAG) and the Australian Information Service (AIS). The ANAG and
AIS had issued posters of these paintings from which the reproductions
had been made. The applicants had not approved the reproduction of
their work on carpets. By importing carpets which infringed protectable
works and which the respondents should have known were infringing
works, the respondents were deemed to have infringed the copyright of
the Aboriginal artists. The applicants sought damages and an order from
the Court for respondents to deliver up the infringing carpets.'
The case indicates that the Aboriginal artists in question were con-
cerned about the accuracy of the depictions of the paintings on the in-
fringing carpets. The Court noted that the paintings "concerned creation
stories of spiritual and sacred significance to the artist," and that it also
had "deep cultural and religious significance to Aboriginal people. "3 In
the Court's words, "[Aiccuracy in the portrayal of the story is of great
importance. Inaccuracy, or error in the faithful reproduction of painting,
can cause deep offence to those familiar with the dreaming."""
The language of the Court suggests that even the most careful repro-
duction of a work of art will not avoid harm to the community repre-
sented in the art and to those to whom the art speaks. Art in such a
society is not only about creativity, it is about community. In this society,
the preservation of sacredness and sanctity, as in the case of Israel and
the anointing tabernacle oil, 36 is prescribed by the law that recognizes
the property. Similarly, with Native American art, particularly among the
Pueblan Indians, the preservation of sacredness is a significant function
131. Alford, supra note 104, at 12-13.
132. Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty Ltd., Federal Court of Australia, 13 December 1994,
(reported in 17(3) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., March 1995, at D-61).
133. This is a remedy recognized in almost all copyright laws, and was recently in-
cluded as an element of the global model for copyright under the TRIPS agreement. See
Trips Agreement, supra note 10, at Art. 46, Part III.
134. Id.
135. Id. (Emphasis added).
136. Id.
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of protecting art forms. As one scholar has noted:
Understanding the sacredness of the art objects of a holistic people
requires a holistic view .... [P]rinciples such as holistic integration of
life within art, are held in common among Native Americans ....
These works provide a multi-faceted window through which to
glimpse and better understand the religion and lifeways ... that made
them and continue, in most instances to make them.'8 7
A third cause of the differences in intellectual property treatment in
the Third World is that the theory of creation or creativity is different.
Under Aboriginal law, for example, "the right to create paintings and
other works depicting creation stories and stories of the dreaming resides
in the traditional owners (or custodians) of the stories or images."' 18 8 This
right is vested exclusively but jointly in the custodians as prescribed by
Aboriginal law and custom. In the same sense, under ancient Israel's the-
ocratic rule, creativity was recognized as a gift from God, thus limiting
the extent to which its fruits could be commodified. 188
A fourth cause of the differences in intellectual property treatment in
indigenous societies is that the value ascribed to creative expression is
jointly held by the group as a whole."' ° This value is not material as such,
thus reflecting the non-commodifiability of certain goods in these cul-
tures. Under Aboriginal law for example, the right to create paintings and
other works about creation is vested in a group of custodians who are
responsible for determining "whether the stories and images may be used
in a painting, who may create the painting, to whom the painting may be
published, and the terms on which it may be reproduced."' 1" By main-
taining such a structured form for administering the right to create, the
Aboriginals are able to guard the value of the meaning of the painting to
their society. The Australian Court in Milpurrurru recognized the per-
sonal and cultural distress that the infringing carpets had caused to the
Aboriginal community, noting that the losses, "which were a reflection of
the aboriginal cultural environment in which the artists reside," could be
accounted for in giving award damages. " 2
Among Native American groups of the Northwest coast, art is used
"as a language of social power, creating images that connote aristocratic
perogatives."' 48 The objects of western intellectual property, such as
songs, formulas, drawings, dances, and emblems are, in these groups,
methods for acquiring power, visible expressions of power, or even sacred
137. Strickland, supra note 121, at 182.
138. Milpurrurru, supra note 132, at D-61-62.
139. For example, it was forbidden for the anointing oil to be reproduced by any indi-
vidual, the punishment being ostracism. See Exodus 30:32. Similarly, the composition of the
perfume Moses was instructed to make could not be reproduced. See Exodus 30:37.
140. See Strickland & Supernaw, supra note 126, at 165.
141. Cohen, supra note 116.
142. Id.
143. Strickland, supra note 121, at 182.
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objects. 14 As Professor Strickland points out:
Western classification systems are out of touch with the American In-
dian world-view. Indeed, even the terms art, art work ...as non-
Indians use them, embody concepts foreign to Native American socie-
ties. Among many Indian peoples, all man-made objects are grouped
together and referred to as that-which-has-been-made. The distinc-
tion between aesthetic objects, sacred objects, functional objects, pub-
lic objects and commercial objects simply does not exist.'" In a holis-
tic society, there are no such lines. 14 1
Finally, a fifth cause of differences in recognition and protection of
intellectual property between indigenous societies and industrialized na-
tions is that the organizing principles of these societies are so different as
to affect the very idea of what is considered the appropriate subject of
private ownership. Most Third World societies are organized around a
social unit which extends certainly beyond the individual and, in most
cases, beyond the nuclear family. The forms and very definition of owner-
ship are thus crafted in a way opposite to property conceptions of western
legal and economic structures central to the development of private and
public law.147 What is representative of intellectual property laws in these
societies are thus, not surprisingly, nothing, like their western
counterparts.
There is one important similarity between the protection of creative
endeavor under western intellectual property laws and in indigenous soci-
eties. Both aim, ultimately, to enhance public welfare by protecting the
fruits of creative effort. Given the value ascribed to creativity in many
indigenous societies, it seems obvious that the protection of the fruits of
creative energy is essential to the well being, to the sense of identity, and
to the preservation of cultural patrimony that is so vital to the viability of
these groups. Similarly, the enhancement of public welfare has long been
the asserted purpose of intellectual property law in Anglo-American juris-
prudence.1 48 The divergent forms that these laws take on in indigenous
societies and in the western hemisphere is the strongest testimony of the
fundamentally different philosophical tenets which underlie these sys-
tems. Above all, the fact that creativity remains a vital part of life and
144. Id. at 184-185.
145. Id. at 184. The distinction between functional objects and aesthetic objects is par-
ticularly important in copyright law. Under the utilitarian function exception, copyright
protection does not extend to works whose artistic features are not distinguishable from its
utilitarian dimensions. "Such works are not copyrightable regardless of the fact that they
may be "aesthetically satisfying and valuable.'" H.R. 5668, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
146. Strickland, supra note 121, at 184.
147. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 325 (1980).
148. See Mazer, supra note 79, at 219. "The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare." Id..
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that it holds such powerful leverage and meaning in these societies tells
the rest of the world that creativity is not only alive, but that it is also
central to the social, political, and economic welfare of indigenous
societies.1 9
IV. THIRD WORLD CREATIVITY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Prior to the TRIPS agreement, intellectual property had significant
international dimensions. Technological advances during the nineteenth
century made the reproduction of literary works relatively cheap, and
thus created a demand for the works of authors and artists. International
piracy emerged as a significant problem which led to the negotiation of
two principal international agreements on intellectual property, namely,
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works'50
and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 51
These two treaties neither created international patent or copyright
rights nor established substantive law in these areas. Rather, the Berne
Convention reflected an attempt to create rights, at the international
level, for individual authors as their works moved through channels of
commerce from country to country. "' Similarly, as suggested by the
events during its incipient stages, the Paris Convention arose out of a
desire to provide protection for foreign works whereby nations agreed to
recognize and protect the rights of foreign artists within their own domes-
tic borders.15 8 The issue, then, for international patent and international
copyright protection was not the absence of similar domestic laws but
149. See Strickland, supra note 121, at 181-189; see also BARBER, supra note 84, at 28-
45.
150. Berne Convention, supra note 42.
151. Paris Convention, supra note 44.
152. See RIcKETSON, supra note 26.
153. The origins of the Paris Convention may be traced back to a temporary law en-
acted by the Austria-Hungarian Empire in 1873, to encourage inventors to participate in an
international exhibition of inventions to be held in Vienna. The unwillingness of inventors
to participate because of fear that inventions would be duplicated and ideas stolen led to
the law which provided special protection for foreign exhibitors and their inventions for the
duration of the exhibition. By this time however, domestic patent systems existed in most
European states. In 1873, the same year of the international exhibition, a Congress was
convened in Vienna with the objective of examining the possibilities for a more effective and
useful international system for protecting patented works. In 1878 an International Con-
gress on Industrial Property was convened as a follow up to the earlier Vienna Congress,
with the purpose of determining the basis of uniform legislation in the field of industrial
property. A proposal for an international union was prepared and sent to other governments
together with an invitation to attend an international conference in 1880. The 1880 confer-
ence adopted a draft Convention, parts of which is still incorporated in the Paris Conven-
tion today. Finally, in 1883, a new conference convened in Paris to adopt and sign a final
draft of the 1880 Congress. This was the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property. It has since been revised several times, the most popular revision being the
Stokholm revision of 1967. See generally BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, supra note 62, at 49-50.
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rather the refusal to extend domestic protection under the law to the
works of foreigners.'" Both treaties built upon concepts of copyright and
patent laws'" s similar to what already existed in the countries represented
as well as that which conformed to the general philosophies of the time.
Professor Ricketson points out that, in the area of copyright,
"[a]lthough the legal theories underlying copyright protection differ
from country to country, the origins of this form of protection in each
country were strikingly similar: the grant of exclusive printing rights
or privileges which were made to printers and publishers soon after
the introduction of printing in Europe in the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries."'"
The concern for providing adequate protection of foreign works re-
sulted in a national treatment principle as the central requirement of the
international treaties. The national treatment principle meant that treat-
ment of foreign authors and their works would be no less favorable than
treatment afforded to the nationals of the protecting country.1 5 This ef-
fectively put a stop to the discriminatory treatment of foreign works.
Thus, the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention did not create
substantive law for member states; further, they also did not impose new
law on the member states. Rather, they reflected, to a large extent, a con-
sensus reached among the states which was legitimated by the existence
of a similar system within their respective domestic countries.
The TRIPS agreement "58 makes the protection of intellectual goods
in the forms and categories recognized in western cultures a mandatory
requirement for nations within the multilateral trading system. TRIPS
requires countries to protect copyrights and related rights,'59 patents (in-
cluding utility and process patents), 60 trademarks, "6' industrial de-
signs, '6 layout-designs of integrated circuits, 68 and trade secrets.'" Part
154. See RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 5-19.
155. This should not be surprising as these countries shared to some degree, a similar-
ity in political structures. The arts have always been a significant part of European culture
and life. It is thus not surprising that these principal treaties have their roots in Europe, but
also, that they were informed by European conceptions of what constitutes civilized society.
Thus in the 1858 Brussels Conference on Literary and Artistic Property an outline of what
would constitute elements of a universal copyright law was prepared by the Congress, which
was of the opinion "that the principle of international recognition of the property of authors
in their literary and artistic works should be enshrined in the legislation of all civilised
peoples." Id.
156. RiCKETSON, supra note 26, at 3.
157. The principle of national treatment is a standard feature of most trade and intel-
lectual property treaties.
158. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at 209-237.
159. Id. at § 1, Art. 9-14.
160. Id. at § 5, Art. 27-34.
161. Id. at § 2, Art. 15-21.
162. Id. at § 4, Art. 25-26.
163. Id. at § 6, Art. 35-37.
164. Id. at § 7, Art. 39.
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II of the agreement requires nations to comply with the substantive pro-
visions of the Berne Convention 65 with the exception of the moral rights
provision.'" This includes nations which may not have acceded to the
Berne Convention. The requirement essentially erodes any possibility
that a nation might independently negotiate its own accession to the
Berne Convention, which has always been a possibility under the interna-
tional aspects of intellectual property protection. Computer programs are
to be protected as literary works for which the Berne Convention does
not yet explicitly provide. The agreement lays a basis for rental rights, 6 '
defines what kinds of marks must be protected,6 8 and provides for mini-
mum rights of all rights holders.1 6 Similar provisions are also made for
industrial designs.1 7 0 Finally, in the area of patents, the agreement estab-
lishes the scope of patentable subject matter, 17 1 defines the rights a pat-
ent must confer on its owner,172 and outlines the conditions for granting a
patent application.17 8 Significantly, the agreement requires a twenty year
protection period for all inventions, products, and processes, in virtually
every area of technology. 7 4 This is a broader right than that which is
currently recognized under the Paris Convention.
75
Part III of the Agreement sets out the obligations of contracting
members to ensure that the rights of domestic and foreign authors and
inventors are effectively enforceable within the local legal system. 7 6 The
treaty does not require the establishment of a separate system of enforce-
ment but establishes civil and administrative procedures and remedies
with which the contracting members must comply. 7 7 Remedies spelled
out in the text include damages, injunctions, imprisonment, fines, and the
right of judicial authorities to order the destruction or disposal of the
infringing goods. 78 The agreement also requires that judicial authorities
have the power to order prompt provisional measures and that criminal
penalties and procedures be provided in the case of wilful infringements
in a commercial transaction. 7 9
Finally, the agreement includes a phase-in time period for countries
at various stages of development to implement legislation to bring their
165. Id. at Art. 9.
166. Id.
167. Id. at Art. 11.
168. Id. at Art. 15(1).
169. Id. at Art. 1.
170. Id. at Arts. 1, 25.
171. Id. at Art. 27.
172. Id. at Art. 28.
173. Id. at Art. 29.
174. Id. at Arts. 33, 34.
175. The agreement raises the level and scope of protection for all categories of intellec-
tual property.
176. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at Art. 41, 42.
177. Id. at § 2.
178. Id.
179. Id. at Art. 35, 61.
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respective local laws and judicial systems into conformity with the
agreement.18 0
The TRIPS agreement at best prioritizes intellectual property, and
at worst, imposes a model assumed to be objectively the "right form" of
intellectual property protection. This "form" has all the elements of west-
ern property concepts, including exclusive ownership, the right to limit
use, and the ownership right of control over the propertized good.
How do Native American or Aboriginal conceptions of intellectual
goods fare under this system? What place does the "holistic world view"
of Native American peoples play in this model? Is there any possibility
that indigenous laws protecting creativity will have room to assert them-
selves in a system based on this foreign model of intellectual property
protection? For example, will an Aboriginal, wanting to sell a painting
depicting the dreaming which he has been given the right to create by the
community leaders, be able to assert against the group a right to dis-
tribute that painting in channels of commerce? Can an art object which is
not considered alienable by a Native American group, yet which is cre-
ated by an individual member of the group, be alienable by such a mem-
ber because copyright law recognizes the member as the "author" giving
this individual an exclusive right to dispose of it? Above all, how will
intellectual goods, which have significant spiritual and cultural meaning
to these peoples, be affected by the commodification which undergirds
the internationalization of intellectual property?
The ramifications of these questions touch on the thesis of this arti-
cle, but cannot be fully addressed here. Suffice it to remark that the cur-
rent international framework does not supply encouraging answers. Un-
fortunately, the burden will once again fall on indigenous peoples to
establish mechanisms which will protect their laws and preserve their
sense of meaning. History suggests, however, that these groups ultimately
face, in the absence of laws which recognize and serve in their interests,18 1
the translation and thus death of objects and values which undergird
their creativity under the current multilateral framework. 8 As Strick-
land observes:
Many non-Indians have a problem in the cultural translation of Na-
tive works. A non-Indian viewer of a Hopi figure, a Tlingit mask, or a
Shoshone-painted hide translates the object into the familiar frame-
work of his own culture. In doing so he confronts the same distortion
180. Id.
181. Virtually all international treaties recognize the needs of developing countries and,
at least on paper, attempt to make some special provisions for them; the TRIPS agreement
is no exception. Without going in to the merits of these "special" provisions, it is important
to note that a system, which at once globalizes a model and yet provides for a mechanism
for assimilating differences, is at best palliative and at worst deceiving. A truly multilateral
agreement must both recognize and serve the interests of all parties, however fragile that
consensus may be.
182. Strickland, supra note 121, at 185.
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as the English-speaking reader of a translated Cherokee lovesong. The
song, translated into English, has its syntax transposed, verb tenses
approximated, and inflections altered. No longer a linguistic reflection
of its maker, the song becomes a carnival mirror, distorting the deli-
cate thought patterns of its creator's culture. The non-Indian's per-
ception of Native American objects requires a similar translation. The
visual arts, and the verbal arts, demand a holistic context. It is sim-
ply not possible to judge the meaning of a sacred object from a view-
point and value structure outside the culture itself.18s
V. SOME IMPLICATIONS
It is quite clear that one of the central motivations behind the
TRIPS agreement was to target enforceability of foreign intellectual
property rights in developing countries. As such, the global model of in-
tellectual property protection imposed by the agreement is not a reflec-
tion of the need to encourage creativity or to promote the public welfare.
Rather, the chief aim of the agreement is to secure from these countries
and societies the full monopoly benefits that western intellectual property
laws offer. The implications of these strategic moves are many, the most
important of which are discussed below.
The need to maintain incentives to encourage creative activity is lim-
ited, in many respects, to western market democracies. These democra-
cies revolve, in large part, around individual autonomy and liberty, not-
withstanding the greater social loss, of nonmaterial value that
individualism tends to breed. The successful commodification of intellec-
tual goods can only be achieved in a society which embraces this sort of
rugged individualism. Until indigenous societies reach this point, the in-
ternational community may have to come to terms with a persistent level
of piracy in international trade. 8' Piracy, however, cannot simply be ex-
plained mechanically in economic terms based on the reasoning that pov-
erty necessitates the availability of cheap products. 185 For many of these
societies, the difficulty in introducing western copyright principles is that
these principles attempt to overturn social values which are centuries
old.'8 6 The laws protecting intellectual goods in these societies simply re-
flect fundamental notions of what the society considers to be the appro-
priate subject of exclusive ownership. The duplication of literary work is
thus, for example, not perceived as stealing but as making a good thing
accessible to the general public.18 7 Knowledge in many indigenous socie-
183. Id.
184. One should note that piracy is not limited to Third World societies/developing
countries. A fair amount of piracy exists in Europe and the United States as well.
185. See, e.g., Remarks by Donald Westmore, Economic Development in the Third
World: What Can Be Expected From the Uruguay Round?, A.S.I.L. Proceedings, April 8-
11, 1987.
186. See, e.g., WILLIAM ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995).
187. For example, China. Id.
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ties is not perceived as something that can be commodified or objectified
through law. It is impossible to ignore such fundamental conceptions in
these communities.
In addition to responding to a persistent level of piracy, the interna-
tionalization of intellectual property also suggests that there is some way
to objectively measure protection of intellectual property. By not taking
into account the possibility of alternative forms of protection, the TRIPS
agreement, as did its predecessor treaties, 88 presupposes that "all civi-
lized nations" will and must recognize this global model of intellectual
property protection. 189 By mandating this model, governments in devel-
oping countries are faced with the difficult job of destroying, or at least
attempting to destroy, native conceptions about life and living and about
what constitutes an ordered society. The allocation of material value to
goods, and the way in which this value is expressed, is grounded firmly in
the history of the evolution of a people. The internationalization of intel-
lectual property threatens to undermine, if not totally destroy, the values
that indigenous systems ascribe to intellectual property and the manner
in which they allocate rights to intellectual goods.
What the internationalization of intellectual property implies, ulti-
mately, is that there is only one way to participate in the international
economy and that is by playing in accordance with prescribed rules, re-
gardless of its impact on a group of peoples. It is a message that is not
unfamiliar in the history of world affairs, and yet it is a message which, so
history informs us, has caused devastation of unimagihed proportions to
human society. The next few years will reveal just how far native peoples,
indigenous groups, and developing countries will fare in the preservation
of their cultural patrimony and in their ability to determine the identity
of their group in an increasingly hostile international economic
environment.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
There is still much to be said about intellectual property and its cor-
onation as the defining element of international economic regulation. For
the purposes of this article, however, only the implications of a system
which denies legitimacy and which threatens the viability of anything op-
posed to it, is important. Third World creativity, regardless of how it is to
be protected, must be recognized not only as a matter of law but as a
matter of life within the various communities. Perhaps an innovation ver-
sus creativity distinction mentioned earlier in the article will prove useful
in helping to fashion a system which offers Third World creativity an op-
188. The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention.
189. Native Americans were "encouraged" in a similar manner to "engage in the indus-
trious pursuits of agriculture and civilized life" by adopting property laws similar to those
recognized at common law. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND SPIRITS 51, 237-238 (1975),
quoted in Strickland & Supernaw, supra note 126, at 103.
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portunity to be protected on terms necessary to ensure its continued via-
bility.190 Innovation, undoubtedly, holds benefits for all societies, al-
though surely it is unnecessary for every society to re-invent the wheel.
On the other hand, some societies may invent better wheels, better at
least, to suit their specific needs as a community." 1 Innovation, however,
does not come without costs. The present form of protecting innovation
incurs particular social costs in Third World societies; costs which are
destructive to the accepted values and principles of their social and polit-
ical organization. It is critical for developing countries, as well as for all
groups of people recognized as forming a distinct ethnic/political entity,
that social costs of protecting innovation and creativity be properly
linked to their specific political, social, and cultural contexts. In this re-
gard, different legal rules may emerge for innovation, rules which fairly
represent the large amounts of capital expended by multinational corpo-
rations and which will also perhaps take into account the years of effort
and resources a community may have invested in perfecting, for example,
an herbal drug through the work of traditional native doctors.19
The TRIPS agreement represents an attempt to protect certain
forms of creative activity (i.e., innovation) in specific ways which have
proved beneficial to corporatized, post-modern economies. As one scholar
has observed:
postmodernity is distinguished by a dramatic restructuring of capital-
ism in the post war period, a reconstruction of labor and capital mar-
kets, the displacement of production relations to non-metropolitan re-
gions, the consolidation of mass communications in corporate
conglomerates, and the pervasive penetration of electronic media and
information technologies. Such processes have coalesced in the West-
ern world societies oriented towards consumption. Consumption is
managed by the mass media's capacity to convey imagery and infor-
mation across vast areas to ensure a production of demand. Goods are
increasingly sold by harnessing symbols, and the proliferation of mass
media imagery means that we increasingly occupy a "cultural" world
of signs and signifiers that have no traditional meanings within social
communities or organic traditions. 9 3
However one interprets the TRIPS Agreement it is important that
190. See supra note 26.
191. See GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 7-14 (1988). One of the
longstanding criticisms of the international patent system has been the way the system
blocks specialized inventions once the idea of, for example, the wheel, has been patented
elsewhere in the world.
192. See Stephen R. King, The Source of Our Cures, 43 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 19, 23
(1991) (noting that the antimalarial drug known as guinine was first used by Indians). See
generally Kirsten Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries,
33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 277 (1992) (discussing in some detail the importance indigenous native
healers in discovering new sources of treatment for modern ills).
193. Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1860, 1862-1863 (1991).
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the current implications to non-Western societies of the internationaliza-
tion of intellectual property not be ignored.
